Israel og landets arabiske minoritet:

Israelsk og/eller palæstinenser?

EIN DOR, GALILÆA (29.09.2011): På vejen herop til Jezreel-sletten, hvor familiens kibbutz ligger, kører vi igennem Wadi Ara, et langt smalt bjergpas med en lang række arabiske landsbyer som Ara, Ar’ara og Umm al-Fahm. I de sidste par årtier er husene kommet tættere og tættere på hovedvejen. Og det er store huse, vi taler om. Nogle af dem kæmpestore.

Arabernes familiemønster er naturligvis anderledes end den jødiske befolknings. Ofte flytter sønnerne ikke hjemmefra, når de bliver gift, men man bygger i stedet en ny afdeling til forældrenes hus, som så langsomt bliver større og større. Men udover husenes størrelse her i Wadi Ara kan man også tydeligt se, at de er velholdte. Bilerne er nye og dyre. Det kan godt være, at de israelske arabere ikke føler sig behandlet ligeværdigt og retfærdigt i det israelske samfund, men blot en køretur forbi deres landsbyer her i Wadi Ara viser, at de i hvert fald ikke lider økonomisk nød.

 
 
Israelsk araber eller palæstinenser?

En gang ville masser af israelere uanset om de var jøder eller arabere stoppe ved den lokale restaurant Barbour, som er berømt for sin hummous, for at slappe af og spise lidt, inden rejsen nordpå fortsatte. Sådan er det ikke længere. De sidste gange, jeg har spist frokost derinde, har gæsterne næsten udelukkende været arabere.

En gang ville de fleste af de lokale araber næsten alle sammen identificere sig selv som israelske arabere. Sådan er det heller ikke længere. Nu omtaler flere og flere sig som palæstinensere med israelsk statsborgerskab. Det er ikke blot at de nu benævner sig selv palæstinensere snarere end blot arabere, men også at de ofte er gået fra at have været israelere til nu blot at være i besiddelse af nogle papirer, der siger, at de har statsborgerskab i Israel.

Det er, kunne man vel sige, baglæns integration. Des-integration – hvis et sådant ord eksisterer.

Mens en stor del af den israelske befolkning lukker øjnene for den udvikling, så diskuteres tendensen intenst i andre kredse, og der er dem, der ser udvikling som en kommende trussel imod Israels sikkerhed. Der er dem, der mener, at det israelske samfund – læs: den jødiske del af det – kunne have optrådt anderledes, og bærer hovedansvaret for, at det er gået galt. Og der er naturligvis også dem, der argumenterer for, at det er de israelske arabere selv, der har skiftet mening, og nu i stigende grad vender sig imod det samfund, de bor i og nægter at blive en del af det.

 
 

Det er ikke bare i Danmark, hvor debatten om integration får følelserne i kog. Hernede er debatten naturligvis meget anderledes, for her handler debatten ikke om indvandrer, hvis forhold til danskheden og ønske om at blive dansk, nogen sætter spørgsmålstegn ved. Her handler det om den oprindelige arabiske befolkning. Den del af dem som ikke flygtede da Israel blev oprettet, og derfor nu er israelske statsborgere. I modsætning til dem, der i dag bor på Vestbredden, i Gaza-striben, Øst-Jerusalem og i de arabiske nabolande, som identificerer sig selv som palæstinensere.

Og selvom araberne naturligvis anser jøderne for at være dem, der er indvandret, så er en stor del af den jødiske befolkning i dag tredje, fjerde eller femte generation indfødte israelere. Jeg har venner, der er 10. og 11. generation indfødte israelere, så de anser naturligvis sig selv for præcist lige så lokale, som de lokale. Samtidig ved vi også, at mange arabere i området på samme måde som jøderne er indvandret hertil for et antal generationer siden. De er blot kommet fra en anden del af Mellemøsten, mens mange af jøderne er kommet fra Vesten. (Her må vi dog ikke glemme, at lidt under halvdelen af den israelsk-jødiske befolkning også selv kommer fra den arabiske verden eller er børn af immigranter derfra.)

Denne lange indledning blot for at nå frem til spørgsmålet om den israelsk-arabiske befolkning.

Der er i dag godt og vel 7 millioner israelere. 1,3 millioner af dem er arabere. Det vil groft sagt sige, at omkring hver sjette israeler er araber. Det er en ganske betydelig del af befolkningen.

For år tilbage voksede den arabiske andel af befolkningen voldsomt, fordi araberne gennemsnitligt fik flere børn per familie end den gennemsnitlige jødiske familie. Det er dog jævnet lidt ud på det seneste. Det er interessant at iagttage, at i takt med at levestandarden er steget og familiemønstret langsomt er blevet mere og mere vestligt, så er det arabiske familiemønster også blevet mere og mere lig det, der er fremherskende i den jødiske del af befolkningen.

Heroppe i den nordlige del af Israel, hvor jeg er nu, bor en stor del af Israels arabiske befolkning. Her på Jezreel-sletten er der et arabisk børnehavepædagog-seminarium, som allerede har eksisteret i et par årtier. Men det er ikke desto mindre en interessant ting. For oprindeligt ville arabiske børn ikke blive sendt i børnehave. De ville gå hjemme hos deres mor indtil de skulle begynde i skolen.

Det har ændret sig. Både fordi mange unge israelsk-arabiske kvinder i dag har en uddannelse og en karriere, og derfor ikke længere er hjemmegående. Interessant er det, at en ung israelsk-arabisk kvinde heroppe i Galilæa i dag har svært ved at blive gift, hvis hun ikke har sig en uddannelse eller er på vej til at få sig en. Det ville være direkte modsat i gamle dage (som ikke er mere end et par årtier eller tre tilbage).

 
 
Israelske araberes familiemønster begynder langt mere at ligne Israels jødiske befolknings end deres palæstinensiske brødres i de besatte områder.

Blot denne lille ting har haft vidtrækkende konsekvenser.

De arabiske børn kommer nu tidligere i skole, fordi de nu både kommer i børnehave og i børnehaveklasser. Dermed er de ved at hale ind på det skolemæssige forspring, som Israels jødiske skolebørn havde. Oprindelig var der omkring to års forskel. Jødiske børn i tredje klasse lå på samme niveau som arabiske børn i femte klasse. Denne forskel er langsomt ved at forsvinde, hvilket er med til at give unge arabere bedre muligheder på arbejdsmarkedet.

Det at arabiske kvinder får sig en uddannelse og en karriere gør, at de arabiske familiers levestandard, familiemønster og forventninger til tilværelsen ændrer sig. De har nu mere og mere de samme ønsker og drømme, som deres jødiske landsmænd. Og – interessant nok – antallet af børn per ægtepar går ned, og begynder mere og mere at ligne det større jødiske samfunds.

Hvorfor fremhæver jeg lige denne side af jødisk-arabisk sameksistens i Israel?

Det gør jeg, fordi jeg ærligt og inderligt tror på, at det modsætningsforhold mellem de to befolkningsgrupper, der naturligt nok ligger og ulmer lige under overfladen på grund af den større militære, politiske og nationale konflikt Israel befinder sig i med sine arabiske nabolande, kan overvindes.

Jeg tror på, at integration, tolerance, åbenhed, ligeberettigelse, uddannelse og så videre kan bringe os et meget langt stykke i retning af at bygge bro imellem to dele af det israelske samfund, som den større nationale konflikt naturligvis graver kløfter imellem. Men, fordi jeg naturligvis også som journalist er nødt til at forholde mig til virkeligheden, som den faktisk er, og ikke som jeg kunne drømme om at den ville være, er jeg naturligvis også nødt til at indrømme, at det i de senere år er gået den forkerte vej.

 
 

En ny bog her i Israel behandler de israelske araberes situation, og den stiller spørgsmålstegn ved, om de nogensinde bliver en integreret del af den jødiske stat. Bogen besvarer også spørgsmålet. Konklusionen er, at de israelske araberes problemer med deres tilværelse som israelske borgere ikke handler om diskrimination, sociale forhold, levestandard eller karrieremuligheder.  De israelske arabere vil ganske enkelt aldrig acceptere Israel som en jødisk stat, og derfor er integration umulig.

Jeg er naturligvis uenig, men det er svært at argumentere med bogen, som er et tæppebombardement af talmateriale, statistik, undersøgelser, dokumenter og andre facts.

Dan Schueftan skriver, at konfliktens egentlige grunde ofte kamufleres af diskussioner om Israels politik overfor palæstinenserne i de besatte områder, men af dens egentlige dybereliggende årsager er arabernes afvisning af Israel som en jødisk stat. Det er, mener han, ”roden til alt ondt”. Og så længe det problem ikke løses, vil modsætningsforholdet bestå og formentlig forværres. Schueftan’s løsning er naturligvis, at araberne må acceptere Israels jødiske natur.

Men man kunne vel også argumentere for, at Israel i stedet kunne begynde at definere sig selv som en stat for alle sine borgere uanset deres religiøse og etniske baggrund. Dette er ikke nødvendigvis i modstrid med, at Israel fortsat kan være et land, der er centralt for verdens jøder, og at mange af statens symboler er jødiske. Jøder, muslimer, baha’i’er, hinduer og andre der bor i Danmark, lever også udmærket med at landets flag er et kors, at Danmarks historie og traditioner har rødder i kristendommen, og at der eksisterer en statsstøttet Folkekirke, som er evangelisk-lutheransk.

Det er klart, at bogen og dens konklusioner kommer på et problematisk tidspunkt (hvilket tidspunkt er for øvrigt ikke det hernede?), hvor de interne spændinger mellem Israels jødiske flertal og landets arabiske minoritet er på et lavpunkt.

Siden udbruddet af Den anden Intifada i 2000, hvor mange politisk aktive palæstinensere aktivt demonstrerede deres støtte til palæstinensernes krav i de besatte områder, er det gået tilbage i forholdet mellem arabere og jøder i Israel. Israelske arabere har et naturligt sympati i forhold til palæstinenserne på Vestbredden, som i mange tilfælde er en del af de samme udvidede familier og klaner. Samtidig var det svært for mange israelske jøder at acceptere, at en del af den israelske befolkning demonstrerede sympati for modparten på et tidspunkt, hvor israelske soldater risikerede liv og helbred i felten.

Da israelsk politi så under en arabisk demonstration i begyndelsen af Den anden Intifada slog ubegribelig hårdt ned på demonstranterne og blandt andet brugte snigskytter, hvorved 13 arabiske demonstranter blev dræbt, skete der noget. Det var tilsyneladende et ”breaking point”. Begge parter syntes at få bekræftet deres værste forudanelser om modparten. Og siden synes ingen for alvor at være interesseret i at læge de sår, der dengang åbnede sig.

 
 
Den anden Intifada

Det er en sørgelig udvikling, som hvis der ikke gøres noget, kan gå hen og blive en ligeså stor trussel imod Israels fremtid, som den ydre konflikt med den arabiske verden og palæstinenserne.

Det er dog måske lige på falderebet værd at bemærke sig en enkelt interessant kendsgerning, som mange lukker øjnene for:

På trods af alt, så lever den arabiske befolkning i Israel selv i dag og på trods af alt det, jeg har nævnt ovenfor langt bedre, med mulighed for at udtrykke sig, stemme, stille op til politiske poster, blive valgt, har en højere levestandard, de har adgang til kritiske medier, til informationer fra hele verden – selv den arabiske, og de leder på alle måder i langt større frihed end araberne i den arabiske verden.

Og det er jo – selvom situationen i Israel på ingen måde er god – alligevel interessant at holde sig for øje.

* * *

Herunder kan du læse en anmeldelse af Dan Schueftan’s bog fra avisen Haaretz. Anmeldelsen er skrevet af Tamar Herman fra Tel Avivs universitet. Hun har i de sidste 18 år stået for det såkaldte ”Peace Index”, som Tami Steinmetz Centret udgiver hver måned. Hun er som jeg heller ikke enig med alle Schueftan’s konklusioner, men anmeldelsen og emnet er ikke desto mindre ganske interessant læsning. Og de problemstillinger bogen rejser nok så vigtige at udforske, blive klogere på og tage stilling til.


 

 

 
 


Books:

Can Arabs be fully integrated into Israeli society?

Dan Schueftan feels that the Arabs of Israel will never come to terms with the Jewish nation-state, and that if anyone is to blame for their situation it is they themselves.

 

Tamar Herman
Haaretz Book Section
September 27, 2011


Palestinim Be’Israel Palestinians in Israel:
The Arab Minority’s Struggle against the Jewish State)
By Dan Schueftan, Zmora-Bitan Publishers (Hebrew)
844 pages, NIS 116,-



Reading this exceedingly thick and hard-to-digest book by Dan Schueftan is a difficult task in the middle of a hot, muggy Israeli summer. But for anyone willing to enter the real and profound debate on the past and future of the complex relationship between Israel's Arab minority and Jewish majority, it offers rich rewards. For them, this book affords an opportunity to probe the subject closely, as it issues a powerful intellectual-political challenge to anyone who believes in the possibility of equality and full integration of the country's Arab citizens into its national life. The author - Dr. Dan Schueftan, deputy director of the National Security Studies Center at Haifa University, and a veteran adviser to decision makers and to heads of the political security establishment in Israel - argues that given current circumstances, there is little current feasibility to the practical application of this option. Schueftan backs up this view with countless facts and statistics, while leaving out other facts that might go against his thesis.

Schueftan doesn't pull any punches vis-a-vis either party in the argument; considerations of political correctness are not his forte. His thesis is razor sharp: The crux of the disagreement and debate between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority is the objectives and the form of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, a premise that - in his view - the Arab public and its leaders fundamentally reject.

 
 
The problem is the aversion of the Arab sector in Israel and its leaders to Israel's very status as a Jewish nation-state, Dan Schueftan writes.

This rejection, says Schueftan, is accompanied by charges that at times obscure the essence of the Arabs' main reservations about the character of the state. These complaints include, for instance, Israeli-Arab criticism of Israel's policy toward the Palestinians in the territories, accusations of various forms of discrimination against them, or the charge that their prolonged economic distress is a consequence of an intentionally discriminatory policy of various Israeli governments toward them. Schueftan argues that this allegation is highly questionable, if not practically distorted. Schueftan believes that the economic and social troubles of Muslim-Arab (as well as ultra-Orthodox Jewish ) society stem from their lack of willingness to adopt a modern, productive lifestyle, as opposed, for example, to Christian Arabs (and non-Haredi Jews ).

Nevertheless, judging by the primary thrust of the book, these are secondary allegations, when compared to the aversion of the Arab sector in Israel and its leaders to Israel's very status as a Jewish nation-state. This sets into motion a major clash, as the Jewish majority would be prepared to fight tenaciously to preserve this status. "As far as this majority is concerned, not only does it not have any choice but to fight in order to prevent its own national destruction, but the mere attempt to instigate this destruction is seen as wholly illegitimate. The majority is certain that it is capable of thwarting any such attempt."

 
 
And the one whom Schueftan believes was the most cunning and nefarious of them all, Azmi Bishara, seen here on the poster.

Hostility and malice
Schueftan ascribes most of the responsibility for the creation of this fundamental distinction to the hostility and malice with which the Arab political and intellectual leadership in Israel represents the reality. "The Arab members of Knesset, with only a handful of exceptions, express and comport themselves as if they do not see a need to establish a common denominator with the Jewish majority, within the framework of the basic premise on which the State of Israel was founded. They focus their political activity on an attempt to alter the most elemental aspects of this premise. ... Alongside their efforts (which everyone in the world legitimizes ) to take advantage of the democratic mechanisms in order to achieve civil equality at the individual and community levels ... they act in a callous and defiant manner to bring down the Jewish state, with the aim of founding in its place a bi-national state, which is itself only a transition stage on the way toward an Arab state."

So as to prove his argument, Schueftan delineates in the second section of his book (taking 355 pages to do so! ) the statements and activities of Arab members of Knesset, past and present: Hashem Mahameed, Abdulwahab Darawshe, Ahmad Tibi, Abdulmalik Dehamshe, Mohammed Barakeh, Taleb El-Sana, Jamal Zahalka and the one whom he believes was the most cunning and nefarious of them all, Azmi Bishara. He then feeds into the same unequivocal historiographical meat grinder the elites of Arab civil society - academics, actors, journalists, authors and poets.

Toward the end of this section, he holds up for critical examination the positions held by the Arab general public - albeit a "softer" examination, as compared to his review of the conduct of the elites. Here, too, he detects clear symptoms of support for, and even active involvement in, acts of terror against Jewish citizens of Israel, and moreover, an espousal of the commonly held consensus throughout the region that utterly rejects the legitimacy of the Jewish nation-state. Yet Schueftan simultaneously determines, on the basis of survey findings and other sources of information, that "there is within the Arab minority a significant element that recognizes the advantages of the State of Israel and its accomplishments and is even proud of them, and proud of its own Israeliness."

 
 
Poster for one of the Arab parties running in the Israeli Elections.

Preference for the radical option
Nonetheless, the unequivocal conclusion reached by Schueftan is that, at this time, there exists a substantive contrast between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel. What's more, as he sees it, the situation is not static, but dynamic, and the range of alternatives is becoming ever more limited: "The choice they are facing is between a process that leads to a dead end, a useless conflict with no conceivable end," should they opt for the attempt to alter the Jewish character of the State of Israel, "or a prolonged process of improvement, one likely to accrue into a profound change in the situation of the Arab citizens of Israel." And if, in the early 2000s, the two societies stood at a crossroads, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the lot, according to Schueftan, has already been cast: "In terms of the Palestinian national minority in Israel, it is doubtful if the path that heads toward a route of profound integration into Israeli society, in the framework of the Jewish nation-state, is still open."

It is clear that Schueftan assigns greater probability to the selection of the first choice, because "the history of this entire people is the story of continued national failure, rooted in a preference for the radical option."

Although the author periodically attempts to see things through the eyes of his subjects, he does not display any empathy for them, even if he does not relate to them condescendingly. Without embellishment, Schueftan presents Israel's Arabs with two alternatives, which in his opinion are the only viable options available to them. The first is to come to terms with their being a minority in a Jewish nation-state, participating in the common framework, while being able to protect their cultural and national identity, without actively identifying with the struggle against Israel; and the second, to fully realize their national identity in another nation-state of their own, and relinquish any claims over land ownership.

Not his intended audience
And yet, despite the severity of the charge sheet Schueftan prepares against Israeli Arab society and its leaders, one gets the feeling that they are not his primary intended audience. A careful reading of Schueftan's lengthy discourse suggests that the real targets of his barbed arrows are in fact those Jewish Israelis who are working for the full integration of the Arab citizens of Israel. In his opinion, these individuals and organizations have a blind spot when it comes to the real motives of the group they would assist. Mainly in the third section of the book, which focuses on economic and societal issues, he mercilessly strikes at these activists, stridently declaring essentially that they are proposing solutions that will only aggravate the problems they profess to solve: "It is difficult to guarantee the Arab population any real chance of extrication from its distress and contributing its part to this process, when there are those raising on their behalf clever proposals intended to sidestep the need for change, for effort, for improving skills and for investing in the future." In this respect, despite its academic bearing, this book is actually a polemic, which clashes, no holds barred, with the Israeli left, and particularly with human rights and civil rights organizations such as Sikkuy: the Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights in Israel, an NGO that Schueftan represents as an empty vessel.

In my opinion, this is the book's weak point. The author grants easy passes to the Israeli decision makers and political leadership, attributing to them minor, if any, responsibility for the current sad state of affairs. In contrast with the acute punctiliousness that he adopts toward the mistakes he finds in the conduct of Israeli Arabs and their leaders, Schueftan does not contend systematically or directly with the notion that very few people would argue with, that the Jewish-Israeli establishment and Jewish-Israeli society have for the longest time related to the Arab minority as a step-child, in the best case, and as a being as troublesome to Israel as a scab.

It would have been fitting, then, to reduce the scope of historic background, and even more so, to cut back on the overabundance of evidence of the negative trends reflected in the statements and actions of the Arab leadership and public, and instead to devote a whole chapter to the criticisms showered on the Arab public by some Jewish-Israeli leaders, and the ongoing negative influence of these criticisms - and actions inspired by them - on the Arabs' ability and willingness to integrate, and which influenced their choice to deal with the situation in the manner criticized by Schueftan.

 
 
Smiling Arab boy in Umm al-Fahm.

Logic also dictates that the author should have plumbed the depths of the historic moment during Yitzhak Rabin's second term as prime minister (1992-95), during which he went to lengths to make Israeli Arabs feel wanted, and to the proven positive repercussions this initiative had - albeit fleetingly - on that population's attitude toward the country and toward Israeliness. In other words, Dan Schueftan discounts the influence of the "Pygmalion effect," familiar to every pedagogical neophyte, by which expectations of bad behavior will produce such behavior, while expectations of good behavior are likely to foster the same.

Nevertheless, the book is recommended reading, in particular for those who cling to the idea of profound and egalitarian integration of Israeli Arabs. All those among us who feel this way are called upon to do some soul-searching as we confront the facts that Schueftan presents. This does not mean that the idea of integration need be abandoned, but both intellectual honesty and political rationalism require us to relate to those stumbling blocks that the book delineates, and call for a grounded, coherent answer to the questions of why and how we can stay the course; even after we have knowledge of these things.

Prof. Tamar Hermann is a political science faculty member at the Open University of Israel and a senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, who writes "The Peace Index," a monthly survey of Israeli public opinion, in conjunction with Prof. Ephraim Yaar.

http://www.haaretz.com/culture/books/can-arabs-be-fully-integrated-into-israeli-society-1.387072


At det ikke kun er arabernes afvisning af Israel som en jødisk stat, der er problemet i forhold til en integration af dem i det israelske samfund ses af de angreb på moskéer, som jødiske ekstremister i de seneste dage har gennemført. Det seneste imod en moské i det nordlige Israel. Herunder et par artikler om det fra den israelske avis Haaretz:

 

 
 

Shimon Peres:

Galilee mosque arson shameful for the State of Israel

The President stresses the importance of the time in which mosque attack took place - the Ten Days of Atonement.


By Barak Ravid
Haaretz
October 10, 2011


President Shimon Peres on Monday condemned an arson attack on a mosque in the Upper Galilee village of Tuba the night before, branding it an immoral and illegal act that contradicts Jewish values and is a source of shame for the State of Israel.

“This is a difficult day for the entire Israeli society, not only the Arab sector,” Peres said.

The president noted the importance of the time in which the attack took place, the Ten Days of Atonement between Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year) and Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement).

"This is a time for reflection, in which we should condemn such acts among us," Peres said. "Acts that sabotage our relationship between us and our neighbors and between the different religions living in Israel.”

Peres warned that Israel would not allow extremists and lawbreakers to undermine the need to live together and with mutual respect.

“I am convinced that the police and security forces will apprehend the criminals and bring them to justice, but it is up to all of us to uphold the law and stand against those who break it,” Peres said.

The mosque in the Bedouin village of Tuba-Zangariyee was set on fire in a suspected "price tag" attack by settlers angry at Israeli policy. The entire interior of the mosque went up in flames, causing heavy damage, and holy books inside the mosque were burned. Graffiti with the words “price tag” was found on the wall of the mosque.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also expressed outrage over the arson, instructing the head of the Shin Bet security service to quickly locate those responsible, his office said in a statement.

"The prime minister was furious when he saw the pictures, and said that the incident contradicts the values of the State of Israel – such as freedom of religion and freedom of worship," the statement said. "The pictures are horrifying and have no place in Israel," Netanyahu was quoted as saying.


 

Israeli Arabs clash with police after apparent 'price tag' attack on mosque

 

Some 300 residents of Upper Galilee village, where mosque was set alight, hurl rocks at security forces, burn tires.


By Eli Ashkenazi and Jack Khoury
Haaretz
October 3, 2011

 
Some 300 Israeli Arabs clashed with local security forces in the Upper Galilee on Monday after a mosque in their village was set on fire the night before in a suspected "price tag" attack by right-wing extremists angry over Israel's policy on West Bank settlements.

According to Israel Police, residents of the Bedouin Arab village of Tuba-Zangariyye began marching to the nearby town of Rosh Pina, while hurling rocks at security forces and burning tires.

Police forces responded to the clashes by firing tear gas and stun grenades at the protesters.

The mosque was set on fire Sunday night, and its entire interior went up in flames, causing heavy damage, including to holy books inside.

Graffiti with the words “price tag” was found on the wall of the mosque. Israel Police said they have arrested several suspects involved in the mosque arson, but did not disclose any details.

Northern District Police Commander Major-General Roni Atia who was on the scene described the incident as “very serious in the context of ‘price tag’ attacks.” Atia has set up a special team to investigate the incident and bring the perpetrators to justice.

Residents of the village described the attack as “very serious.”

“It is obvious that Jewish extremists did this, despite the internal divisions we have, no one here would dare harm the mosque," one of the residents said.

 

 


 
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