Reformer eller revolution i Syrien:

Har Bashar al-Assad forpasset chancen?

Der var store forventninger til Bashar al-Assad, da han for 11 år siden kom til magten. Men ikke meget er sket. Og nu slår regimet hårdt og brutalt ned på ethvert krav om reformer.
Der var store forventninger til Bashar al-Assad, da han for 11 år siden kom til magten. Men ikke meget er sket. Og nu slår regimet hårdt og brutalt ned på ethvert krav om reformer.

JERUSALEM (15.04.2011): Hun bliver kaldt ”regimets ansigt udadtil”. I hvert fald er det almindeligt accepteret, at Boutheina Shaaban taler på den syriske præsident Bashar al-Assads vegne. Derfor lyttes der, når hun taler. Hun begyndte som oversætter for den tidligere præsident Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s far, blev derefter minister, og tituleres nu som medie- og politisk rådgiver for den syriske præsident.

Efter en flodbølge af uroligheder og opstande har skyllet hen over den arabiske verden, og det ene årtier lange diktatur efter det andet bukker under for folkelige krav om mere frihed og demokrati, var det naturligvis imødeset med store forventninger, da de syriske myndigheder efter uroligheder også brød ud i Syrien for nogle uger siden inviterede til pressemøde med Boutheina Shaaban.

 
 
Boutheina Shaaban. Når hun taler, hører man Bashar al-Assad... troede vi i hvert fald tidligere. Nu er det måske ikke længere sandt.

I starten kørte talskvinden naturligvis løs på sædvanlig ”arabisk autopilot” med de forventelige udfald imod ”fremmede, udenlandske kræfter”, der trak i trådene og ”uansvarlige medie-organisationer” som inspirerede til opstande, uro og undergravende virksomhed. Selvom den slags automatsnak, tåbelig som den er, kan være alvorlige og skadelige nok i sig selv, hvis der er nogen, der tror på det, så er den forventelig, og der er næsten ikke længere nogen, der tager det alvorligt. Det er ligesom et nødvendigt forspil, inden en arabisk leder eller officiel talsperson får sig talt varm, og når frem til det, det egentlig handler om..

Det der var interessant ved Boutheina Shaabans pressemøde var mere, at hun nok så diskret og underspillet også fik antydet, at præsidenten godt kunne forstå den utilfredshed, der ulmede i den syriske befolkning, og at der nu ville blive sat ind med reformer og lempelser. Blandt andet ville der blive løsnet op for Syriens undtagelseslovgivning og stramme censurlove og begrænsninger i pressefriheden.

Det var i det mindste en åbning.

Man burde naturligvis have fået en mistanke, da talskvinden påstod, at regimet præcist var i gang med gennemgribende reformer, som nu desværre måtte indstilles, fordi situationen pludselig var blevet så ustabil.

Hallo?!? Efter 11 år, hvor meget lidt er sket, skulle Bashar al-Assad-regimet tilfældigvis lige have været midt i en afgørende reformproces præcist på det tidspunkt hvor vreden og frustrationerne i landet nåede eksplosionspunktet? Måske et lidt for underligt sammentræf.

Og i hvert fald burde man sikkert have fået lidt mistanke til at de lovede lempelser i pressefriheden heller ikke var så alvorligt ment endda. For det sidste spørgsmål, som Shaaban fik ved pressekonferencen, gad hun ikke svare på. Så mens hun rejste sig for at gå, sagde hun bare, det var et spørgsmål, der var for vigtigt til at pressen skulle have noget at vide om det.

Alligevel var der efter Boutheina Shaabans pressemøde store forventninger til den tale, præsident Bashar al-Assad en uge senere holdt i Nationalforsamlingen – den syriske undskyldning for et parlament (totalt ligegyldigt og totalt uden betydning).

Efter en timelang historisk udredning med store, overordnede og ligegyldige politiske betragtninger, gik han i flæsket på dem, der står bag urolighederne. Man fristes til at sige ”the usual suspects”.”External forces” – ”udenlandske kræfter”, som forsøger at undergrave Syrien, blev medlemmerne af Nationalforsamlingen at vide. Ingen af dem syntes det mindste overraskede. Det var ligesom det, de nok forventede.

Set med præsidentens øjne var der ikke tale om legitime politiske krav om mere frihed. Der var et spørgsmål om lov og orden. Brud på den offentlige ro, trusler imod staten og stabiliteten, kriminelt og noget myndighederne ville slå ned på.

 
 
Myndighederne lovede bl.a. mere pressefrihed. Det eneste, man har set, er mere brutalitet og restriktiv politik.

Overhovedet intet af det, talskvinden Boutheina Shaaban havde lagt op til. Intet om forståelig utilfredshed, lempelser, mere frihed eller noget som helst andet.

Tiden efter præsidentens tale har vist os, at systemet ikke vil dialog med de protesterende, men at myndighederne, præcist som under Bashar al-Assads fars tid, uden problemer bruger alle sine magtmidler imod befolkningen, hvis systemet føler sig presset. Syriske og internationale menneskerettighedsorganisationer taler om 2-300 syrere allerede mistet livet under urolighederne i landet. Andre uofficielle kilder sætter tabstallet højere.

Det er endnu for tidligt at afgøre, om Bashar al-Assad stadigvæk kan nå at afmontere krisen med dialog og reformer, eller om tidspunktet er forpasset. Nogle iagttagere og eksperter mener, at syrernes frygt for uro og omvæltninger fortsat giver præsidenten mulighed for at forhandle sig ud af problemerne.

Der er også dem, der siger, at systemet omkring Bashar al-Assad er så forstokket, og at frygten indenfor den ledende alawittiske elite for, hvad der vil ske med dem, hvis de mister magten, er så stor, at reformer og mere frihed ikke er mulig.

Vi får at se. I hvert fald er krisen i Syrien ikke overstået lige nu og her.

Efter tre måneder hvor jeg primært har dækket omvæltningerne i Tunesien, Egypten, Bahrain og Libyen, er jeg nu ved at læse mig ind på stoffet om situationen i Syrien. Og, selvom det er svært, ringe til mine kontakter og kilder i Syrien og Libanon for at høre deres syn på sagen.

Her får I lige en række udenlandske artikler om emnet samt en kronologi over den seneste måneds begivenheder i Syrien fra Reuters, så I også kan begynde at læse Jer ind på stoffet.

Det er en ordentlig omgang, så sørg for at have tid, lav en kop kaffe, sæt dig i lænestolen og nyd det.


 
 

Assad’s Lost Chances

By Carsten Wieland
MERIP – Middle East Research and Information Project
April 13, 2011

On January 31, the Wall Street Journal printed words that Bashar al-Asad must wince to recall. In an interview with the newspaper, the Syrian president said that Arab rulers would need to move faster to accommodate the rising political and economic aspirations of Arab peoples. “If you didn’t see the need for reform before what happened in Egypt and Tunisia, it’s too late to do any reform,” he chided his fellow leaders. But Asad went on to assure the interviewer (and perhaps himself): “Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence…you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances.”

Not even two months later, confrontations between protesters and security forces across Syria shook the Baathist regime harder than any challenge since the 1980s. No matter what the course of the upheavals, the Syria that many have known for decades will never be the same. The protests have torn asunder the delicate fabric of rules, explicit and implicit, that for decades have determined the relations between the regime and the citizenry. By Syrian standards, the political concessions promised by regime representatives to quiet the unrest are far-reaching; long years of civil society activism were unable to achieve them. By the yardstick of the times, however, the moves have turned out to be inadequate. Following a presidential speech to Parliament on March 30, it looks like sweeping reform is an empty promise. And a rising number of Syrians are not swallowing their disappointment. The pervasive fear for which this police state is infamous has given way to unpredictable bursts of popular anger, as well as hope for a better future.

President Asad, for his part, may soon feel twinges of nostalgia for the days when Syria’s main source of dissent was a group of intellectuals of the Civil Society Movement, most of them elderly, who for the past ten years have called for political pluralism and civil rights. He may miss the occasions on which he was presented with elaborate declarations, lists of signatures and critical articles appearing in the Lebanese press but meant for Syrian consumption. Many of the authors share the Baathists’ pan-Arab orientation and hardline stance toward Israel; they could have been secular partners who built bridges to Islamist and other more radical forces.

Just after the US invasion of Iraq, in May 2003, many observers pricked up their ears in surprise when a central regime figure commended the Syrian opposition for its prudence. Bahjat Sulayman, the powerful former head of Syrian intelligence, wrote in the Lebanese newspaper al-Safir, “In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but ‘opponents’ whose demands do not go beyond certain political and economic reforms such as the end of the state of emergency and martial law; the adoption of a law on political parties; and the equitable redistribution of national wealth.” [1] Forcible regime change, Sulayman knew, was only on the agenda of select exiles and US politicians.

But President Asad treated the Civil Society Movement intellectuals, with their debating clubs and talk of a soft landing for Syria’s transition away from authoritarianism, like a gang of criminals. The days are over when obstreperousness is defined as discussion in the back rooms of teahouses suffused with the aromatic smoke of water pipes. Now the Syrian president faces tumult in the streets and the whiff of gunpowder.

Patterns of Unrest
No one knows how the street unrest in Syria will end, and not only because information about the demonstrations and clashes is so scarce. The focal points of unrest in mid-April, the southern agricultural town of Dar‘a and the Mediterranean port of Banyas, are no-go zones for journalists, with all forms of communication with Banyas reportedly cut. Reporting from anywhere in Syria has been scanty throughout the crisis. An additional question is to what degree Syrian cities and villages have been gripped by fears of sectarian incidents, score settling among groups with vested interests or heightened criminal activity -- all specters raised by the regime -- as the protests escalate.

Yet the outlines of a minimum outcome have already emerged: Power relations will be renegotiated. Inside the regime, key posts have been reshuffled amidst rumors of open discord between Bashar al-Asad and the security services, between Asad and the army, between Bashar and other members of the Asad clan and, possibly, between ‘Alawis, Sunnis and members of other sects in the upper echelons. The regime has less leeway in its social, economic and political decisions going forward; it will have to frame them more cautiously, with more urgent attention to good governance and less reliance on repression, lest the next round of protest be far more vigorous than that of 2011. But the current round is far from over, in any case, and its maximum outcome is regime change. For years, Asad has quelled demands for fundamental change with piecemeal, sometimes cosmetic reforms. Some strata of the public have considered him part of the solution; the danger is that he will lose these people and become part of the problem.

In its foreign policy, ideological makeup and social composition, Syria differs greatly from Tunisia or Egypt, so the momentous events of 2011 in those countries will not simply be replicated. Yet the pattern of Syria’s immediate crisis is quite similar to those in other Arab countries. The protests were sparked by a minor incident: Teens in Dar‘a were detained for spray-painting buildings in town with graffiti inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, including the famous slogan, “The people want to overthrow the regime.” A “day of rage” was declared. The police, unused to civil unrest, overreacted and shot several protesters dead. Anger rose countrywide and triggered more widespread demonstrations, which have been met with more brutal force, in turn fueling more protest.

Bashar al-Asad has mostly kept a low profile, feeding the early gossip that he and his family were feuding over how to respond. The president has behaved like the leader of a “jumlukiyya,” as the Syrian opposition calls the country’s political system, melding the Arabic words for republic and monarchy. Rather than assuming responsibility for the crisis, the “republico-monarch” has shunted the blame downward, offering to replace the cabinet and sack the lieutenants responsible for the hot spots around the country. In terms of public relations, the regime has tried to make do with sending advisers, deputies or ministers before the cameras to explain its point of view, trotting out the president only in extremis. Much of the regime’s verbal response has aimed to criminalize the protests or portray them in sectarian terms; in tandem, the regime has resorted to lethal force to suppress the agitation. As the protests spread, the regime turned to attempts at political accommodation and, eventually, measures of appeasement.

In Tunisia and Egypt, such concessions had no conciliatory effect upon the crowds because they always came a few days or weeks too late. In Syria, as well, the concessions appear poorly chosen for the circumstances. On April 7, Asad granted citizenship to some 150,000 of Syria’s Kurds who had been stateless, answering a long-time demand of Kurdish advocacy organizations. The measure was so overdue that Asad got little credit. “Citizenship is the right of every Syrian. It is not a favor. It is not the right of anyone to grant,” retorted Habib Ibrahim, leader of a major Kurdish party. Other concessions, like permitting schoolteachers to wear the niqab, or full face veil, and closing a casino, are meant to placate Islamists but mean little to the wider base of opposition demonstrators calling for real political reform.

In the initial weeks, the demonstrators’ wrath has not, by and large, targeted Bashar al-Asad himself. But the hits are drawing closer and closer to home. Great fury is directed toward Bashar’s brother Mahir, who has a reputation for personal cruelty and, as head of the Fourth Division of the Republican Guard, is a bulwark of authoritarian rule in the country. Other names increasingly heard in the protesters’ chants are ‘Asif Shawkat, husband of Bashar’s sister Bushra and deputy chief of staff of the army, and, above all, Rami Makhlouf, who owns Syria’s cell phone companies, duty-free shops and almost everything else that promises quick profits. Like his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, Makhlouf is beneficiary of a classic predatory arrangement, whereby his unquestioning political loyalty buys him commercial monopolies bestowed by the state. The stories of Makhlouf’s corruption incense ordinary Syrians, from the working poor to the endangered middle class. No wonder the first wave of protesters in Dar‘a burned down the local cell phone company outlet, as well as the court building and the Baath Party offices.

Sitting It Out
As late as January, Asad thought he could sit out the season of Arab revolts. As supportive Syrian columnists tirelessly point out, Asad is a relatively young man at 45, unlike the aging Arab leaders in trouble elsewhere. He has made no pact with the US or Israel, keeping him close to public opinion on regional issues. His backers adduce additional pillars of legitimacy: Asad has maintained law and order in times of great turbulence in the bordering nations of Iraq and Lebanon; his secular Baathist regime has safeguarded an atmosphere of relative religious and ethnic tolerance, which many in the region admire; and the president has cultivated a humble public persona, in contrast not only to dictators like Saddam Hussein or Muammar al-Qaddafi, but also to their uncouth sons. In the eyes of many Syrians, the junior Asad has not lost his image as a reformer frustrated at every turn by an irascible old guard.

The country has indeed made progress during the ten years of Asad’s rule in areas that are not directly related to democracy or human rights. Syrian media outlets are more numerous and plainspoken than under Bashar’s father Hafiz, from whom he inherited power in 2000, provided that they do not cross red lines related to politics, religion and sex. Arts and letters have benefited from more freedom of expression. Though several Internet sites are permanently blocked, Syrians have far more access to information and the outside world, through satellite TV, blogs and foreign media. Cell phones and other modern equipment have become accessible to a wider range of people. Women’s organizations have gained strength and are granted room to maneuver even if they are not legally registered or explicitly supportive of the government.

There is, in fact, considerable sympathy for Bashar al-Asad among the population, though some of it stems from fear of the unknown. The manifestations of pro-regime sentiment that have popped up alongside the protests, particularly in Damascus and Ladhiqiyya, may be orchestrated by the state, but they are also emotionally real for the participants. Many members of religious minorities, such as Christians and the Druze, not to mention ‘Alawis, watch the present upheavals with distinct unease, as they contemplate possible backlash from the Sunni majority. The ‘Alawis, from whose tribes the Asads and their inner circle hail, worry they will suffer communal retribution for the ruling clique’s ways. But much of the Sunni merchant class, as well, has so far stuck to an alliance with the Asad regime. As minorities and middle-class Sunnis make up more than 50 percent of the population, they are not a negligible constituency.

 
 

No Damascus Spring
Here lay an opportunity for Asad shortly after he took power in June 2000: Had he mustered the courage to curtail vested interests and dismantle obsolete Baathist structures in the early years, he might have called for free elections and won them. As a leader with a genuine social base, he could have confronted the militarist policies of President George W. Bush without falling back upon dusty pan-Arab themes or Islamist-sounding rhetoric. His position would be correspondingly stronger today. But Asad chose not to put his rule to a popular test.

The Civil Society Movement of Syria claims the mantle of intellectual pioneer of the 2011 Arab revolutions, with the addendum that Tunisians turned out to be the champions in practice. The short-lived heyday of this opposition movement starting in September 2000 was known, indeed, as the “Damascus spring.” That fall, the writer Michel Kilo headlined a group of intellectuals who published the “manifesto of the 99,” followed in December by the “manifesto of the 1,000.” The distinguished secular philosopher Sadiq al-‘Azm was a key signatory. The intellectuals’ aim, to paraphrase the pointed words of Alan George, was both bread and freedom. [2] Riyad Sayf, an entrepreneur and outspoken member of Parliament, went the furthest, putting forward social-democratic ideals of a “fair market economy” that he upheld with decent labor practices in the companies he owns. Politically, he called for a constitutional state, an independent legislature and courts, and a free press. But Sayf crossed a red line when he announced his intention to found a party of his own. He was arrested, and the “Damascus spring” turned cold as the debating clubs in Damascus teahouses closed down.

Today, the regime may hastily introduce political pluralism (or a semblance thereof) under the pressure of the street. A new party law meant to break the stranglehold of the Baath Party has been gathering dust in a presidential desk drawer for years. But it is one thing for the regime to introduce such reforms under circumstances of its own choosing and quite another to do so under duress, with the latter step likely to embolden the opposition to press for more. The same dynamic holds for the regime’s various other promises, like tackling legal discrimination against citizens of Kurdish ethnicity, erecting a legal framework for the activities of NGOs or promulgating a new media law. It even holds for declaring an end to martial law, a step that, rhetorically, has always been tied to liberation of the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation and the end of hostilities with Israel. Now it is purely domestic stresses that are bringing such measures to the forefront of regime calculations. The regime is losing one trump card after another.

Waves of Suppression
The massive street protests reached Syria precisely when the regime was in a phase of increased suppression of opposition forces, whether the older Civil Society Movement or the bloggers and Internet activists of more recent vintage. Several well-known human rights defenders are languishing behind bars. The unrest also arrives at a time when Syria has managed to extricate its head from the noose of international isolation.

The successes in establishing better international relations are rooted in a series of decisions since 2008 that, on the one hand, reflect a break with the past, even paradigm shifts, and, on the other hand, display the growing maturity of President Asad in foreign policy matters. A new Syrian pragmatism has emerged after a phase of ideological encrustation during the early phases of the Iraq war that can be explained by both raison d’état and desperation amidst the bellicose talk emanating from Washington.

In the past, it was plausible to advance the thesis that Syria’s isolation and the regime’s feeling of existential threat from outside was making the regime reluctant to open up the political system and apt to crack down heavily on opposition movements. Many had hoped that Syria would adopt domestic reforms when the foreign threat abated. Instead, the reverse has arguably occurred. One experienced Syrian analyst who has worked inside the government conceded in an interview: “I made the same mistake. I thought there was a correlation between foreign and domestic policy…. With or without external pressure, we have no political change in Syria. Domestic pressure is a continuity not a contradiction.”

Three waves of suppression have swept through Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s ten years in power. The first began in 2001 with the completion of the clampdown on the debating clubs of the Civil Society Movement. Asad had adopted the Chinese model: The regime would pursue economic reform, but political and administrative reforms would be discarded. No democratic experiment was in the offing as US threats of regime change began to emerge in 2002, and the Baathist regime subsequently entrenched itself in harsh ideological opposition to the Iraq war. Pressure mounted on Syria, especially from Saudi Arabia, France and the United States in subsequent years, culminating in the autumn 2003 passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling upon “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon,” and then the Hariri assassination in February 2005, which eventually compelled Damascus to summon its troops in Lebanon home.

In the face of the regime’s obvious weakness, and with the encouragement of Western diplomats, the opposition picked up momentum. It took a historic step toward unity with the Damascus Declaration of October 16, 2005. For the first time, all major opposition groups -- ranging from the secular civil society movement to Kurdish activists to the outlawed Society of Muslim Brothers in their London exile -- issued a manifesto for democratic change in Syria. The lengthy document called for an end to emergency law and other forms of political repression, a national summit on democracy and a constitutional convention to draft a charter “that foils adventurers and extremists.” The head of the Civil Society Movement, Michel Kilo, composed the Declaration. Under this document, Asad could have been still part of the solution. No Asad statues were toppled in Syrian cities. But, again, he chose to crack down.

The second wave of persecution followed in the first half of 2006, when those who had been spared in 2001, including Kilo and human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni, were arrested. The hunt for signatories of the Damascus Declaration was justified by the charge that they were pursuing Western interests.

The first two arrest campaigns adhered to the logic of interrelation between domestic and foreign fronts. The third, however, began at the end of 2009 when Syria had already celebrated its reemergence onto the international stage. In October of that year, the regime arrested Haytham Malih, head of the Human Rights Association of Syria, and since then has imposed travel bans upon dissident intellectuals and otherwise sought to intimidate them. The 80-year old Malih was released only during the hectic weeks of late March 2011, after he had gone on hunger strike.

 
 

In all three waves of suppression, the secular Baathist regime has silenced the moderate, secular voices calling for pluralism and piecemeal reform. This history is related to why Islamist currents appear to be gaining ground in Syria. To be sure, the Islamization of opposition politics is a general trend in the Arab Middle East and no country is immune. Yet there are other, more specific explanations for its appearance in Syria. First, the regime, despite its secular orientation, and often more out of necessity than enthusiasm, is allied with Islamist partners like Iran, Hizballah and Hamas in an “axis of resistance” to US and Israeli prerogatives. A second explanation is that, not unlike other Arab regimes, Damascus adopted a conscious strategy of toleration for Islamism. A leading Syrian opposition figure characterized the Baathist-Islamist relationship as follows: “We get state power; you get society.” Not only did this arrangement obviate a domestic threat, it could be presented to the West as evidence that Syria would turn Islamist if the Baathists were to lose the state. During its confrontation with the United States in the mid-2000s, Syria facilitated passage of Islamist militants into Iraq in order to weaken the US occupation and also engage in preemptive self-defense.

In the January 31 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Asad was still advancing a version of this argument. Acknowledging the need for some change in the state, he continued: “But at the same time you have to upgrade the society and this does not mean to upgrade it technically by upgrading qualifications. It means to open up the minds. Actually, societies during the last three decades, especially since the 1980s, have become more closed due to an increase in close-mindedness that led to extremism.” [3] In other words, Arab societies are not ready for Western-style democracy. The choice is between stability and chaos, between superficial, state-led secularism and a fundamentalist stone age. In his inaugural speech of June 2000, the young president had already made his position clear. “We cannot apply the democracy of others to ourselves,” he said. “Western democracy, for example, is the outcome of a long history that resulted in customs and traditions, which distinguish the current culture of Western societies.… We have to have our democratic experience which is special to us, which stems from our history, culture and civilization, and which is a response to the needs of our society and the requirements of our reality.”

Some Westerners have bought into the discourse prescribing a cultural path to democracy, at least when it is politically opportune to do so. Michel Kilo has expressed his frustration with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who, during a September 2008 visit to Damascus, reiterated Asad’s notion that Syria would create a democracy of a distinct style. The intellectual says that afterward he reminded the French ambassador in Damascus that it was the French who disseminated the idea of universal human rights. Sadiq al-‘Azm, similarly, has warned against the tendency to posit a “Western human rights” that differs from “Islamic human rights” or the “Asian human rights” that Malaysia and China have tried to propagate. [4]

No Arab leader has explained why it has taken so long for his allegedly immature people to learn the ropes of democracy. It grows harder and harder to explain, since the reigns of some autocrats have lasted over 30 years, as in the Yemeni case. Even the ten-plus years of Bashar al-Asad’s rule in Syria have apparently not been enough time to pursue incremental change and build institutions without compromising on security, foreign policy restraints and other Syrian particularities. Now the window of opportunity may have closed.

Sparks Igniting
The movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and other Arab states have proven four postulates. First, the aspirations of peoples are indeed universal. As peoples in other parts of the world have done, Arabs have revolted against poverty, social injustice, corruption, censorship, police intimidation, disrespect for the rule of law and lack of individual opportunity. The calls for accountability, freedom and political pluralism in the Arab world have no cultural or religious coloring and are very much compatible with demands elsewhere. Second, the protesters are articulating these grievances without any foreign impetus, save the urge to emulate the achievements of fellow Arabs. The revolts are homegrown.

Third, the civility, creativity, peacefulness, communitarian spirit and social, religious and ethnic solidarity during the protests have shown in a remarkable way that, whatever their rulers say, Arabs are indeed mature enough for democracy. The militarization of some movements, as in Libya, has to be considered separately from the origin of the protests. Fourth, the carriers of revolution come from many strata of society, including the educated, but politically muzzled middle class that is exposed to economic shocks and fears of socio-economic decline. Most of the protesters in the Tahrir Squares of the Arab world are not inspired, and apparently not very impressed, by the slogan “Islam is the solution.” The Arab peoples, as Rashid Khalidi points out, have reasserted their dignity by refuting the patronizing attitudes of kings and presidents-for-life. [5] Today’s revolutions, Khalidi continues, are not the first democratic ones in the Arab world but the first directed against Arab, rather than colonial, rulers.

A new Arab nationalism of a civil nature has begun to crystallize around the demonstrations. Egyptians have placed photos on Facebook showing themselves holding up ink-colored fingers as proof of their participation in the March 19 referendum on constitutional amendments in advance of the free elections that are scheduled for the fall. Others uploaded a new status message: “Proud to be an Egyptian.” Still other Facebook pages display the crescent and the cross -- the twin religious symbols of the protests in Cairo and, now, Damascus.

The calls for dignity, participation, accountability and freedom will put Syria’s neighbors to the test as well. The Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is close to Syria in the fields of security, foreign policy, economy and tourism. Both sides speak of “family ties.” Joint meetings of the countries’ cabinets have become routine. At the same time, Turkey is seen as a model by many Arab opposition forces that seek to build democracy in majority-Muslim societies. Erdoğan has emerged as a sharp critic of Israeli human rights violations but also of Arab despots, whom he has urged to pursue reforms, most vocally in the case of Husni Mubarak of Egypt. The Syrian crisis will test the commitments of Erdoğan and his government. Can he uphold a democratic agenda while supporting a deeply troubled, undemocratic Asad regime?

On another front, Israel may ironically turn out the actor that most sincerely hopes for a continuation of the Asad regime. Syria has been an enemy of Israel, but a stable and reliable one. The Asad regime has retained sufficient influence over Hizballah to persuade the Lebanese Shi‘i Islamist party, if need be, to exercise restraint on Israel’s northern border. With the developing unrest inside Syria, however, all bets are off. The lowest-order question is whether a weakened Baathist regime in Damascus will still be able to negotiate a peace with Israel (that is, if either side really wants it). From there, the questions for Israel only grow more difficult. If the regime is replaced by parties unknown, nostalgia for the Baathist era could soon set in among the upper echelons in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The status quo, for all its irritations, has often been convenient: Whatever their outcome, the Arab revolts have already eroded Israel’s ability to stake claims on Western sympathies by calling itself the only democracy in the Middle East.

The West has a strong interest in stability in Syria, too. In January, President Barack Obama decided to bypass Congress and send the first US ambassador to Damascus in five years -- just in time, as it turned out. Western politicians once again face a precarious balance between their stated values and pragmatic interests, the latter of which include the protection of Israel. The interest in stability on Israel’s northern flank goes a long way toward explaining the US stance as the upheavals in Syria broke out. Speaking on the CBS program “Face the Nation” on March 26, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointedly declined to condemn the repression in the harsh terms used in the Libyan case, much less entertain talk of intervention. An international consensus behind such measures “is not going to happen,” Clinton said. She continued, “There’s a different leader in Syria now. Many of the members of Congress from both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe he’s a reformer.” Subsequent US statements have been stronger, but the tone remains dramatically different not only from the condemnations of the Libyan regime, but also from rhetoric employed by President George W. Bush.

Against the background of demonstrations across the country, it is not shocking that the Syrian security services have approached representatives of the Civil Society Movement. The intelligence officers whose invitations to chat were once the equivalent of warning shots, if not warrants of arrest, are now asking their old “opponents” to revive their movement. But it is too late in the game.

Over the years, the Civil Society Movement has lost Clinton’s faith in Asad’s will to reform. In November 2010, when today’s events seemed a remote possibility at best, Michel Kilo reflected upon the movement’s failures. He complained that the movement was stopped in its tracks before it was able to broaden its circle of supporters, much less engineer the foundation of parties. But, in accordance with revolutionary patterns in Europe, he said, Syria’s educated middle class had been awakened. “Once the spark ignites the younger generation, we can withdraw,” Kilo concluded. “At least we have paved the way.” [6]

Endnotes
[1] Al-Safir, March 15, 2003.
[2] Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom (London: Zed Books, 2003).
[3] Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.
[4] Interviews with Sadiq al-‘Azm, Damascus and Berlin, November 2010.
[5] Rashid Khalidi, “Preliminary Observations on the Arab Revolutions of 2011,” Jadaliyya, March 11, 2011.
[6] Interview with Michel Kilo, Damascus, November 2010.

Source:
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041311


 
 


Weathering the Storm

By Alias Samo
BitterLemons-international.org
April 14, 2011

It started with a brave but desperate act of self-immolation. This time it was not a cry in the wilderness, as is the norm in the Arab world, but a spark that ignited the Arab world, including Syria.

Yet while there are demonstrations in Syrian cities, practically no signs or slogans of "enough" or "leave" have appeared as on the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Benghazi and Sana'a. It should also be noted that no demonstrations to speak of have taken place in Aleppo and Hama, two centers of Islamic activism. This is a good indication that sectarianism is not a factor in the demonstrations. As is well known, the spark for the Muslim Brotherhood's 1978-82 violent confrontation with the Syrian government was in Aleppo, and the finale was in Hama.

The people who are demonstrating in the streets are by and large looking for President Bashar Assad to reform, not to resign, and for several reasons. First, he has cultivated an image that presents him as humble, civil and likeable, unlike the typical arrogant, authoritarian image for which many Arab leaders are known.

Second, he is popular not only with Syrians but with many Arabs. He is viewed as the last warrior facing Israel and refusing to submit to American dictates. He is seen as an Arab leader viewing issues from an Arab nationalist rather than just a Syrian perspective.

Third, it is unfortunately true that blood has been shed in several Syrian cities. Yet pragmatic Syrians appear to have rationalized that the Egyptian-Tunisian scenario is not an available option even if they wanted it. Nor do they relish the bloody Libyan-Yemeni scenario. Thus, they have opted for reform and not regime change. They want less emergency law and more freedom, less corruption and more transparency, less security and more liberty, less of one party and more of multi-party, less nepotism and more competency.

President Bashar has committed himself to reform. If promises become policies--and the sooner the better--he will emerge stronger and more credible. In fact, some promises have become policies already, such as the overdue change of government, the removal of the governors of Daraa and particularly of Homs, and Kurdish citizenship registration.

In a certain respect, the Arab uprisings have worked to Syria's advantage, particularly with regard to Egypt, Bahrain and Israel. The downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his regime is both a victory for Egypt and a blessing for Syria. Syrian-Egyptian relations have been on a roller-coaster for decades, particularly since the break-up of the United Arab Republic in 1961. Strained relations reached a breaking point after the 1973 war with the development of the Sadat model. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat put all his eggs in the American basket and signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, as opposed to Syrian President Hafez Assad's model of leading the steadfastness front against Israel and maintaining his distance from Washington. The Hafez-Sadat conflict was followed in recent years by the Bashar-Mubarak conflict, for similar reasons. Although Mubarak's downfall was due primarily to domestic causes, anti-Israeli and anti-American feelings shared by both peoples might now open the door for rapprochement between Cairo and Damascus.

As for Israel, and in light of changes in Egypt and uncertainty in Jordan, peace with Syria should now become an urgent matter. The Israeli strategic defensive wall is composed of neutralized and demilitarized Sinai in the west, occupied Golan in the northeast and the Jordan River basin in the east. Now, security arrangements regarding Sinai and the Jordan River basin could become problematic. It is true the Golan has been stable and quiet--but certainly not forever.

Bahrain is simmering, as is historic Shiite Farsi vs. Sunni Arab animosity. The introduction of the Gulf Cooperation Council's forces in Bahrain has increased tension between Tehran and Riyadh and could lead to a confrontation. President Bashar is one of the few Arab leaders who maintain good relations with both sides, particularly with Tehran. This affords him leverage with Tehran to help reduce the tension and avert a potential confrontation.

Finally, during the last decade President Bashar faced serious external challenges and threats, particularly from the US, and survived. With prompt reforms, the Syrian domino piece that teetered temporarily will hopefully weather the storm and remain standing and President Bashar will survive the domestic challenge.

Elias Samo is professor of international relations at American and Syrian universities.

Source: http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1366


 
 


Paying Lip Service to Resistance does not Provide Immunity

By Karim Emile Bitar
BitterLemons-international.org
April 14, 2011

The refreshing winds blowing from the Atlantic to the Gulf are dealing a serious and hopefully fatal blow to deeply-ingrained western misconceptions about the Middle East. The orientalist dogmas underlying foreign intervention--from Bonaparte's 1798 Egypt expedition to George W. Bush's 2003 Iraq invasion--are shattering. The western gaze will no longer be the same; the times they are a-changin'.

No one can any longer refer to the "Arab street" with condescension. Arab publics can no longer be ignored, described as lethargic, inherently illiberal, fanatical or incapable of taking a hand in their destiny. The Arab revolutions were driven by a moral quest for justice and dignity, and by secular demands that put to rest the theocentric notion that everything that happens in this part of the world is driven exclusively by religious motives.

Recent events also demonstrate that a popular grid of analysis that divides Middle Eastern powers between the so-called "axis of resistance" (mumana'a) and the so-called "moderate Arab regimes," is actually a sinister joke. Whether "moderate" or "radical", the first and foremost priority of every single regime in the Middle East and North Africa region is its own survival. Everything else is negotiable. We have seen that the allegedly "moderate" regimes were among the most ruthless in their repression of political opponents, bloggers, and human rights activists. But while it is true that spineless subservience to Dick Cheney does not equal moderation, it is also true that paying lip service to resistance does not provide immunity from popular anger. Nor can it quell the legitimate aspirations of freedom-hungry new generations.

Herein is the Syrian regime's predicament. Even if many Syrians feel fine about their country's foreign affairs, their wrath over domestic concerns is not appeased.

President Bashar Assad early understood that the United States committed a major strategic blunder by invading Iraq under fallacious pretenses, with disastrous long term consequences. Syria welcomed, assisted and absorbed more than 1.3 million Iraqi refugees, not an easy task for a country of 22 million. Many ordinary Syrians felt this was right. Syria strengthened its strategic partnership with Iran and provided political and logistical support to Hamas and Hizballah, while pursuing indirect negotiations with Israel, even during the July 2006 Lebanon war. The Syrian regime dug in its heels and weathered the storm during the Bush administration's era of hubris. Then Syria broke its isolation thanks to Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy, and to France's impulsive and nervy Nicolas Sarkozy, whose Syria policy consisted in doing the exact opposite of his predecessor.

Today, the domestic situation is much more problematic. But once again, foreign powers may allow the Syrian regime to survive or at least gain time.

Cosmetic changes and minor reforms are no longer sufficient. Syria is in dire need of radical political, social and economic transformation. Politically, younger generations need oxygen. The 48-year-old state of emergency is a symbol of oppression. Syrians who work in agriculture or industry can no longer make ends meet. The informal economy is very large and most workers have no social safety nets. The black market is flourishing. A small group of individuals control the telecom industry, agro-business, commerce and real estate. The Syrian economy needs an overhaul. Crony capitalism and remnants of rigid bureaucratic socialism offer the worst of both worlds. Add to this a set of enormous regional disparities that need to be addressed. The riots started in the small underprivileged agricultural town of Daraa. In other regions, masses of disaffected youth are deprived of basic rights and opportunities; they too dream of a better future, inspired by Tunisia and Egypt. Turning a deaf ear to them is not a realistic option. With courageous reforms, Syria can rapidly move toward economic success. It has assets: high literacy, a young population, tourist potential, and little debt, to name a few.

Yet, to judge from history, the regime seems incapable of reform. If it regains momentum, the protest movement can threaten the regime's survival. Syrians reject the specter of sectarian strife but are nonetheless committed to serious change--today, rather than tomorrow. Bashar Assad cannot meet their demands without hitting close to home and facing powerful vested interests, which he seems unable or unwilling to do.

Here, once again, the Syrian regime's hope comes from abroad. To understand why Hillary Clinton calls Bashar a "reformer", it's important to keep in mind that the Obama administration is under intense pressure from Israeli, Jordanian and Saudi allies who desperately want to maintain the Middle Eastern status quo. During the Egyptian revolution, these states lobbied hard to "Save Private Mubarak". When this became impossible, they asked the US for guarantees against further destabilization. Despite differences with Bashar, most if not all of the regional powers support his stability. And this probably will make the difference.

If so, it would constitute a bitter irony and the ultimate paradox: Syria's foreign policy, while appreciated by the public, is not enough to assuage the protestors. At the same time, foreign powers, who resent Syrian foreign policy, may end up saving the Syrian regime in the name of realpolitik, in this case the "devil we know" or the dubious theory of a "lesser evil".

Karim Emile Bitar is a fellow at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) in Paris, and the editor of "L'ENA hors les murs" monthly magazine.

Source: http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1367


 
 


A Twist in Syria’s Sobriety

By Rime Allaf
BitterLemons-international.org
April 14, 2011

Even with the benefit of recent regional experience, the Syrian regime has been quite stunned by the protests shaking the country--but not nearly half as stunned as the Syrian people themselves.

Having spent the last half century under martial law and under the heavy thumb of a very authoritarian regime, Syrians had for the most part adapted to their reality and formed a semi-positive perspective: they had neither the proverbial bread nor freedom, but it was still better than being like Iraq or Lebanon, especially as the country remained under permanent pressure from Israel and its allies.

These factors were little consolation, however, when people under similar regimes began to manufacture their own future and impose their own demands; were Syrians doomed to watch from afar, with the only characters with the guts to stand up to injustice relegated to the TV series Bab al-Hara and similar fictional places? While the full answer to this question can't yet be given, the exasperation that is surfacing brings with it a certainty that no matter what happens next, some things have already changed forever.

The first major change, of course, is in the threshold of fear. Even with dire warnings about the potential for lost stability through a spectrum of social and religious ills (and with the threatened sectarian "fitna" the regime is marketing), it seems the Syrians who have already come out will stay out, confidently recruiting more people to their cause. Indeed, heavy repression from security forces has so far merely served to attract more protesters, and to spread outrage across the country at the huge number of casualties at the hands of Syrian security forces.

That such an openly heavy-handed response would follow peaceful protests, and would even target the martyrs' funerals, has shocked many Syrians to their core, jolting them into action and pushing them into the unchartered territory of trying to impose their will on the regime. In doing so, their expectations have also changed over what the regime is capable of, or willing to do.

For one, the decade-old belief held by many that there was an old guard hindering the reform process was shattered by the president himself, whose speech turned several commonly-held notions into immediate urban myths. In very clear words, the president explained that, contrary to rumors that he was held back, his entourage actually pushed him towards reform. In other words, the buck stopped with him, and people would be informed when the government, at its discretion, was ready to make reforms.

This could have been understood as contradicting earlier promises made by various Syrian officials. But in fact, serious changes were clearly effected in response to popular pressure, in turn giving protesters more impetus to continue demanding their rights and to keep the pressure up.

Remembering how quickly the regime can act when needed, many people mentioned the fact that the Syrian constitution had been changed in mere minutes in 2000 (to allow for President Assad to take power at the age of 34), and the sudden change from a closed economy into an open one in 2005 (to punish Lebanon by discouraging Syrians from dealing economically with it, following the withdrawal of Syrian troops). However, both these changes had been driven by specific regime needs.

Now, for the first time, a big change has occurred driven purely by the pressure of the Syrian people: not only have officials promised that the hated emergency law would soon disappear, but the regime suddenly granted Syrian citizenship to hundreds of thousands of stateless Syrian Kurds.

In a few short weeks, with protests of a very small size relative to other Arab countries, Syrians have already achieved phenomenal changes, despite paying a heavy price with so many dead, injured and detained. For the first time, Syrians have been able to directly pressure the regime into making immediate changes, a tool they are likely to continue using while the regime responds and acts to save itself from further damage.

The official response, of course, is that this is all a conspiracy threatening the very unity of the nation. While it's not the first time Syrian media has gone into full-blown nationalist frenzy, it's the first time this has happened in direct response to pressure from the Syrian people, making the media campaign anything but deja vu. Unprecedented in scale and in content, and not allowing for a single mea culpa or an Egyptian army-style salute to the fallen martyrs, the current Syrian media campaign is itself an indication of how threatened the regime feels at the prospect of the Arab spring blooming in Syria.

Regardless of the context, what is happening in Syria is truly revolutionary--if not a revolution. But while the regime has not hesitated to crush the protests openly and brutally, it doesn't seem to have realized yet that no amount of force can or will tame the protesters, and that the only way forward is drastic change, rather than inconsequential reform. Syrian officials have started speaking of a second corrective movement, which will do nothing to assuage people's frustration.

With other Arab regimes seemingly throwing their weight behind the Syrian regime, fearful of the reach of this inconvenient Arab spring, the prospect of outside influence to push for real domestic change seems to be practically nil. Save one important regional player with much at stake in its relationship with Syria: Turkey.

Recent statements by the Turkish prime minister, and messages passed by Turkish officials and even Turkish media, have been crystal clear: reform, right now. After years of cultivating this relationship, unable to turn a blind eye to the current repression, it is clear that Turkey is potentially one of the most significant foreign factors to influence Syria, either playing a role in helping save the regime from its own excesses, or helping save the Syrian people from their predicament.

It's difficult at this point to predict which way the wind will blow, but Syrians seem determined to have a lot more than merely the right to remain silent.

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

Source: http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1368


 
 


At the Point of No Return

Nizar Abdel-Kader
BitterLemons-international.org
April 14, 2011

As millions of Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Libyans protested with demonstrations and calls for reform and change, many analysts speculated that Syria was unlikely to be next. Five weeks ago, Syria appeared to be a powerful regional player with a domestic political status that left very little possibility for surprise. Snowballing demonstrations that would bring brutal reaction from the strong security organs were unlikely.

Syria under the Assad family remains under tight control. The army as well as the security apparatus is run by trusted Alawite leaders. In addition, the legacy of brutality against internal opponents is well-known from the time of President Hafez Assad.

In 2005, President Bashar Assad, without any political discussion, decided on his own to move towards what was viewed as economic liberalization. Such a step should have been linked to political reform, but nothing of that happened. Systemic corruption in the regime led to an economic justification for the birth of a new class of powerful elites in the immediate entourage of the president's family. The idea that Syrian society would no longer tolerate all the forms of abuse and economic exploitation to which it had been subjected completely escaped Bashar.

When violence first broke out in Daraa, rather than undertaking steps towards reforms and making concessions to absorb the demands of protestors, Assad reacted with excessive violence and repression. The disproportionately brutal reaction in Daraa caused snowballing demonstrations in many cities and towns.

Assad's speech at the parliament on March 30 was a disappointment. Contrary to all expectations, it did not even fulfill any of the public promises made earlier by his advisor Bouthaina Shaaban. He did not repeal the emergency law and he went as far as accusing the protestors of being part of an external anti-Syria conspiracy hatched by the United States and Israel.

In the past two weeks, Assad has sought to respond to the growing number of protestors with limited concessions through granting citizenship to stateless Kurds and establishing a special committee to study the lifting of the emergency law in effect for the past 48 years.

In reality, Assad enjoys broader popular support than did President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt or President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. But he made a grave mistake when he decided to rely on his security organizations to quell the protests. He should have grasped from the beginning that in order to maintain his regime's legitimacy he should recognize the quest of the protestors for freedom, dignity, and reforms. He still fails to see that the resort to violence and the consequent increased loss of lives will galvanize new segments among the population.

The regime is now facing three different challenges. The first is resentment by a very large segment of the people who deplore the lack of freedom and justice. The second is the growing desperation of the poor due to the high rate of unemployment, low wages, and soaring prices of commodities. And the third challenge is the staunch opposition to the regime on the part of thousands of dissidents living abroad, along with Islamists, Muslim Brothers, Kurds, and Palestinians in Syria.

As the Syrian people continue to challenge Assad's regime, the United States and the European Union are in no hurry to step forward to back the protestors and condemn atrocities committed on the Syrian streets. The reason behind such a policy seems to be a concern that change might bring about a government more hostile to western interests. The nightmare scenario seems to be centered on the possibility of an Islamic theocracy led by the Muslim Brotherhood ruling in Damascus. Although the US and the EU have very little influence over what is going on right now in Syria, they should call on Assad to make meaningful political reforms and should use the threat of increased sanctions.

In Lebanon, there is general concern over what is happening in Syria as future developments may have a direct effect on the political, social, and economic stability of the country. Lebanese political factions are not unified in their interpretation of the Syrian crisis. While the March 8 majority perceives that the stability of Lebanon and its well-being depend greatly on the strength and stability of the Assad regime, the March 14 coalition sees the weakening of the Assad regime as a catalyst to achieving its objectives in sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. Additionally, many analysts link the present difficulties facing prime minister-designate Najib Mikati in forming a new government to the fallout from Syria.

To sum up, looking at the way events are evolving, the Assad regime does not have effective means to find a long-term solution. If there is one thing that we can now predict, it is that the regime will do everything necessary to remain immune to popular demands for freedom and reforms. Assad saw what happened to Mubarak and Ben Ali when they began offering concessions. He has opted to project an image of strength and tight control. This policy may enable him to hold on to power for longer. On the other hand, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the regime may prove more brittle than we can predict right now.

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a Lebanese political analyst and author of three books: "Iran and the Nuclear Bomb", "A Nation without a Fence", and "The Israeli Strategy to Destroy Lebanon".

Source: http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1369


 
 


Why Syria is Unlikely to be Next… for Now

By Bassam Haddad
Arab Reform Bulitin
Cernegie Endowment for International Peace
March 9, 2011

As millions of Arabs stir their respective countries with demonstrations and slogans of change and transition, certain Arab states have been generally spared, including some oil rich countries and Syria. Syria stands out as a powerful regional player without the benefit of economic prosperity and with a domestic political climate that leaves a lot to be desired. Some say it combines the heavy-handedness of the Tunisian regime, the economic woes of Egypt, the hereditary rule aspects of Morocco and Jordan, and a narrower leadership base than any other country across the Arab world. Why, then, is all relatively quiet on the Syrian front?

We can delude ourselves by resorting to facile explanations related to the threat of severe coercion facing a potential uprising in Syria—which certainly does exist. But the reality of the matter is more complex. To begin with, one must account for the unexpected: a clumsy incident involving a disproportionately brutal reaction against civilians, even in Syria, will spin structural variables out of control.

“Syria is not Egypt”
Any cursory review of the Syrian press, or the press on Syria, reveals that many Syrians empathize with the grievances of their rebellious Arab brethren and share many of them. This includes those who actually protested in small numbers and were harassed and/or beaten on Friday, February 4th, the planned “Day of Anger” in Syria, and during the few days prior. Other sporadic incidents took place in the past few weeks, but none rose to the level of an explicit anti-regime demonstration, as happened in Egypt and elsewhere. This puts Syria in stark contrast with Egypt.

Egyptian protesters grew in courage gradually as civil society snatched gains such as degrees of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of organization and contestation by truly independent political parties, not least among whom is the Muslim Brotherhood, even if by proxy. On the other hand, Syrian civil society does not enjoy nearly the same measures of liberty. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was correct in saying that Syria is not Egypt in a January 31 Wall Street Journal interview. The reverse is equally true.

As repressive as the government of former President Hosni Mubarak might have been, Egypt’s public space was much more open than that of Syria. Independent papers, parties, and political activists have proliferated in Egypt for the better part of the past decade, gaining adherents and mobilizing supporters via various forms of networking. With time, the components of, and room for, collective action have broadened considerably. Between 2004 and 2010 more than 6,000 small- and medium-sized protests took place throughout Egypt, most of them labor protests. Over the past decade in Egypt, these led to a level of individual and group empowerment—as well as re-politicization of the society—from which Syrians are quite removed.

In addition, while social polarization and poverty are increasing in Syria and social safety nets are deteriorating, the overall socioeconomic conditions are nowhere near those endured in Egypt. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of Syrian society (in terms of politics, region, community, sect, and ethnicity) exacerbates divisions among those affected and discourages cohesion among the opposition. Snowballing demonstrations that would dramatically raise the cost of brutal reaction in Syria are thus unlikely for the time being. As matters stand today, the calculus of the ordinary Syrian does not favor going to the streets – absent an unexpected incident of regime brutality, of course.

…Nor is it Tunisia or Libya
Individual and group decisions are not motivated solely by social connectivity, legal permissiveness, and collective action. Otherwise, Tunisia’s revolt would have not seen the light of day, as Tunisians dwelled in a security atmosphere intolerant of independent organization and collective action, much like Syria’s today. But Tunisia’s state, regime, and government did not overlap nearly as much as those of Syria do, and certainly the Tunisian coercive apparatuses and army were not as closely knit around the heights of power as they are in Syria. As a result, expecting the Syrian army/security services to jettison al-Assad as their Tunisian counterparts did to Ben Ali is simply a non-starter.

At the same time, despite the existence within both the Libyan and Syrian regimes of a will and rationale to fight for survival, state-society relationships in Syria are much thicker than those of Libya, where detachment at the top has reached delusional levels. For instance, the Syrian regime has promoted a new cross-sectarian business class often with considerable roots in traditional city quarters. If something is afoot in Syria, however, it is likely to come from the northern cities.

The “Resistance” Factor
Discussions of Syria’s vulnerability to internal protests often posit Damascus’s resistance status to explain why Syria will be spared: i.e., that because of Syria’s confrontational stance toward Israel and the United States’ brutal policies in the region, the regime enjoys a form of Arab nationalist legitimacy. In particular, Syria’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas is considered a unique and legitimate tool for manifesting such confrontation to imperialism. After all, President Bashar al-Assad polls quite well throughout the region compared to other Arab leaders, and enjoys significant popularity among various segments of Syrian society.

Still, overemphasizing the regime “resistance legitimacy” is problematic on two counts: first, even in Egypt, where Mubarak was viewed as a U.S. protégé and Israel’s accomplice, the demonstrators did not make that point a major issue. Second, the region is entering a new era in which Syria’s confrontational stance might become less unique, as Egypt and other Arab governments take more independent positions and withdraw from the strong U.S. orbit.

It is difficult to make blanket predictions due to the constant dynamism of the factors involved. While Syria’s confrontational positions regarding Israel and the United States might be increasingly popular in the region, the citizens of democratizing Arab states will want governments that are more responsive to them regarding domestic as well as foreign policies. The Syrian government will face this growing demand in due time. For now many factors weigh against revolution in Syria, barring an extraordinary event such as an excessively violent regime reaction to a demonstration or other incident. Observers would be wise not to hold their breath.

Bassam Haddad is Director of the Middle East Studies Program and teaches in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. He served as founding editor of the Arab Studies Journal and is co-founder of Jadaliyya e-zine.


Source: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=42936&utm_source=Arab+Reform+Bulletin&utm_campaign=03474a3dc6-ARB+Weekly+%28English%29&utm_medium=email


 
 

 

Timeline:
Protests rock
Bashar al-Assad’s Syria

Reuters
April 8, 2011

AMMAN (Reuters) - Here is a timeline of events in Syria since protests started in March.
     Syria has been under emergency law since the Baath Party took power in 1963 and banned all opposition.


March 16
o Security forces break up a silent gathering in Marjeh square in Damascus of about 150 protesters who were holding pictures of imprisoned relatives and friends.
o The next day human rights group Amnesty International condemns the violent crackdown by security forces. Witnesses tell the rights group at least 30 people were arrested.
March 18
o Security forces kill three protesters in Deraa, residents say, in the most violent response to protests against Syria's ruling elite.
March 20
o Crowds set fire to the headquarters of the ruling Baath Party in Deraa, residents say. "No, no to emergency law. We are a people infatuated with freedom!" marchers chant.
March 21
o In Deraa, hundreds of black-uniformed security forces line the streets but do not confront thousands of mourners marching at the funeral of a protester killed in Deraa. March 22 - Hundreds of people march in Deraa and Nawa, two southern Syrian towns, demanding freedom.
March 23
o Syrian forces kill six people in an attack on protesters in the Omari mosque complex in Deraa, and later open fire on hundreds of youths marching in solidarity.
o An official statement says later that President Bashar al-Assad has sacked Deraa regional governor Faisal Kalthoum.
March 24
o Assad orders the formation of a committee to raise living standards and study scrapping the emergency law in place in Syria for the last 48 years, his adviser says.
March 25
o At least 200 people march in Damascus and there are reports of at least 23 dead around the country including, for the first time, in Damascus.
o In Deraa, thousands march in funerals for some of the dead, chanting "freedom." Witnesses say protesters haul down a statue of Assad's father, late president Hafez al-Assad, before security forces open fire from buildings.
o Amnesty International says at least 55 people have been killed in Deraa in the last week.
o Hundreds of people chant "freedom" in Hama, where in 1982 thousands of people were killed by Syrian security forces in a crackdown on Islamists.
March 26
o Twelve people are killed in protests in the town of Latakia. Assad deploys the army there the next day.
March 28
o Armed forces fire into the air to disperse a pro-democracy protest in Deraa as the crowd chants "we want dignity and freedom" and "no to emergency laws."
o Amnesty cites unconfirmed reports as saying 37 more people had been killed since March 25 in protests in Damascus, Latakia, Deraa and elsewhere.
March 29
o Government resigns. Assad appoints Naji al-Otari, head of the government that stepped down, as the new caretaker prime minister.
o Thousands of Syrians hold pro-government rallies after two weeks of pro-democracy protests.
March 30
o Assad does not lift Syria's decades-old emergency law in his first public speech since the wave of protests started, defying expectations.
o Assad says he supports reform but offers no new commitment to change Syria's rigid, one-party political system.
April 1
o At least 10 people are killed when security forces open fire on protesters in the city of Douma. Demonstrators have set up a vigil outside the mosque. April 3 - Thousands of Syrians call for freedom at the funeral of eight protesters after Assad asks former agriculture minister Adel Safar to form a new government.
April 7
o Assad grants Syrian nationality to Kurds in eastern Syria to deflect pro-democracy protests and cool resentment over nearly 50 years of strict Baathist rule.
April 8
o Protests erupt across Syria and 17 people are killed in Deraa. Protesters there also smash a stone statue of Basil al-Assad, the president's late brother, witnesses say.
o More than 80 people have now been killed in three weeks of protests.

 

 

 

 

 

 
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